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Network Industry Regulation: Between Flexibility
and Stability1
Alexandre Ditzel Faraco & Diogo R. Coutinho2

This article discusses some challenges of network industries regulation.
We argue that certain economic activities (such as telecommunications and
the distribution of electric energy, gas, and water)—the performance of
which necessarily depends on the use of physical infrastructure
(networks)—have characteristics that require a regulator to maintain highly
stable rules in order to avoid harming the end users that the regulation
intends to protect. Such stability is important in the developed world, but is
even more important in developing countries such as Brazil because of
severe restrictions on public spending and a serious lack of infrastructure,
the building of which requires private capital.
We argue, however, that stability in the rules and decisions regarding
regulatory policy should be accompanied by mechanisms that allow for
flexibility and the capacity to adapt to new situations. In practical terms, it
is necessary that there be a place for changes that are driven by, among
other factors, technological change and an increase (or decrease) in the
degree of competitive rivalry among the economic agents that use the
networks. Additionally, changes forwarded by legitimate political demand
(equity arguments, for instance) should also be considered, being in all
cases necessary to evaluate the pertinence of such changes in face of the
regulatory regime.3 In this context, we maintain that there should always be
awareness about the possibility of undesired or counterproductive effects
from regulatory action, regardless of how good the underlying intentions
are. This tension between flexibility and stability is illustrated with our
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discussion of the 2004 Brazilian legislative proposal to eliminate payment
of subscription to fixed-line telephone service.
This article is divided into five parts.
theoretical

discussion

regarding

changes

The first two parts offer a
in

long-term

regulatory

commitments and the need for institutional stability. Part I specifically
deals with the idea of regulatory commitment. It establishes a basis for
understanding that there is a reasonably identifiable moment in which a
good part of the rules of the game for private investment and regulatory
action are defined. Additionally, part I explains the frequently conflicting
demands that are placed upon the regulator in his role as a mediator of
interests. Part II references the literature regarding the counterproductive or
paradoxical effects of regulation with an emphasis on the need to consider
regulation’s function in an adequate balance between means and ends.
The final three parts of this article discuss the theoretical background and
how it will be employed to analyze the regulatory commitment challenge in
Brazil.

Specifically, this article analyzes the anticipated effects and

implications of a draft statute that substantively changes the initial terms
under which fixed telecommunications services have been transferred to
private companies. Part III describes the draft statute, which is designed to
end fixed-line telephone monthly subscription payment. In Brazil, the user
of a telephone line usually has to pay a monthly fee to have the service
available, and that includes a certain number of minutes of local calls.
Besides this fee, the user has to pay a separate per-minute rate for long
distance calls and local calls that surpass the minutes covered by the
monthly fee. Furthermore, a one-time installation or hookup fee is also
charged when the line is initially installed in the user’s home.

The

proponents of the draft statute argue that the monthly fee—which is charged
even if no calls are made—hinders the capacity of low-income citizens to
have a fixed-line telephone at their homes. Therefore, the proposal was
made to tackle universal service challenges.
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We argue that the legislative proposal is a highly uncertain means to
reach that end. Under the existing regulatory commitment, if the draft
statute was approved, the recently privatized telephone company would be
entitled to increase the per-minute rate or the installation (hookup) fee. If
this provision is enforced, the change could actually limit access to
telephone lines and use of the service. In order to avoid this undesired
effect, the regulator could be tempted or pressed to ignore a provision
central to the current regulatory commitment. Also, the regulator could
either refuse to respect the right of the private company or significantly
delay the procedure that would lead to the increase in the per-minute rate or
the installation fee. But this would create serious instability that would
hinder future investments in the telecom sector and, as a consequence,
would also limit access to fixed telephone lines and use of the service.
Next, part IV briefly presents some suggestions that should have been
considered in order to achieve, with certainty and transparency gains, the
same goals—as compared to the proposal to end monthly subscription fee—
but which would not also be seen as a possible source of conflict with the
regulatory commitment.

Finally, part V summarizes this article’s

conclusions.

I. PRIVATIZATION AND REGULATORY COMMITMENT
In the 1990s, because of economic and political constraints,4 many
developing countries took advantage of privatization as a way to attract
private capital and regain their ability to invest in infrastructure.5 The state
enterprises that were sold were then valued on the basis of expected future
profits, which made it possible to estimate their net present value.6
The “present value” of the company, in turn, was estimated in light of the
compulsory investments (required as part of the consideration for the
acquisition),7 which would reduce the maximum amount a buyer would pay
for the company. In other words, the investments that the government
required the buyer to make were taken into consideration when deciding
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how much to bid at auction.8 The same can be said of expectations of future
profitability for an enterprise associated with a public service, the
calculation of which considers regulatory action and supervision by the
governmental body with authority over the sector.
In this context, the circumstances in which the privatizations took place
in Brazil in the 1990s,9 and the economic calculations made in the auctions,
were forward looking. That is especially true for concessions or licenses to
provide public services, the timelines for which are generally long—twenty,
twenty-five, or thirty years.10

Cumulatively, the circumstances of

privatization have a determinative effect in private investment, in its
profitability projections, and in the design of long-term regulations that are
of limited flexibility because of the long-term concession contracts or
licenses.
It is also relevant to explain some characteristics of network industries,
which provide an array of public services, such as water, sewage,
electricity, and gas.11 These industries are capital intensive, demanding
large scale investments, and have substantial sunk costs. They present
significant economies of scale, they generate consumer externalities, and
they “hook” their users—i.e., the user of the service does not easily change
its supplier.
Further, these networks often exemplify the concept of a natural
monopoly: operating a single company is more efficient than any other
market structure because of underlying economies of scale.12 Finally, such
providers face the challenge of permanent expansion not only in physical
terms, but also with respect to the possibility that many citizens live in
remote areas and/or live with a low income, which is a prevalent situation in
Brazil. Therefore, public services face the difficult task of universal service
coverage.
If private companies controll these network (or public service) industries,
their regulation must ensure that consumer demand is met at the same time
as investors make a reasonable return. Such a task is not easy. First,
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investors must be encouraged to pass along the benefits of productivity
gains and technological and managerial innovations to consumers.
Furthermore, regulation must seek a sort of “optimal point” at which the
rates paid by consumers are as low as possible without prejudicing returns
that private investors will consider adequate. These events do not happen in
a vacuum; underlying the regulatory action is almost always a concession
contract or license that, together with the regulation, makes up the nucleus
of this long-term commitment.
Another characteristic of network industries is that, in most cases,
consumers cannot simply decide to switch service providers. Because of
the natural monopoly characteristics noted above, or because competition is
only incipient, there is no way out for the consumer; if the consumer is
unsatisfied, he or she can only complain to the regulator or courts and wait
for these to take action.13 Private investors, for their part, must make largescale, sunk and long-term investments;14 therefore, they will be concerned
about the risk of their assets and future profits being expropriated, directly
or indirectly, by the government, which may expropriate either
opportunistically or with good intentions.15
If private investors suspect that there will be any type of expropriation,
they will immediately suspend or delay their investments in order to avoid
losses or to pass their losses on to consumers—the hold-up effect.16 The
risk or the implementation of regulatory measures that are identified with
the expropriation of assets or profitability increase the risk premium that
investors demand for taking on a concession or license.17 This is especially
true in developing countries where conditions for private investment in
infrastructure are deemed, in general, to be more risky than in developed
countries.18
During the privatization process, there appears to be a point when the
rules of the game are defined and subsequently crystallize. This moment
can be fairly well-identified for each regulated sector. At that moment of
crystallization, something referred to in the jargon of regulation19 as
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“regulatory commitment” forms between a government and private
investors. It is a sort of initial agreement that, while not immutable, can
only be amended through consensus. Such changes must be made at an
appropriate time and should never be implemented extemporaneously.
Many developing countries, including Brazil, largely defined the terms of
their regulatory commitment, although not definitively, during the process
of privatizing their state-owned companies.20 The terms of the acquisition
and the investments requirements were generally stated in the requests for
bids (or equivalent documents in the privatizations) or, if some regulatory
structure had already been created, in rules published by the agency or
ministry in charge of the sector.21
Because of the financial, fiscal, and economic difficulties faced by
governments, maximizing the sale price in the auctions—which almost
always meant short-term gains that would be used to pay down the public
debt—sometimes overshadowed the more careful planning for investments
required for the long term.22 That, coupled with requirements for adaptation
that could not have been anticipated by the parties involved, led to the
current situation.

Currently, regulatory rules are subject to change

initiatives that reach to the heart of the regulatory commitment (i.e., to the
expected return of the private investor, estimated when he or she decided to
make the investment and in view of the regulations then in force).
It is understandable how an abrupt change to the regulatory commitment,
either by the government or a private company, is a risk for the regulation
of public services. Besides the legal consequences that can result from an
abrupt change to a concession contract or license (or from the
concessionaire’s or licensee’s failure to fulfill it), there are powerful
symbolic effects in countries that are dependent on foreign capital entering
the country and (even more dependent) on capital staying there.23 A threat
to change the rules of a game that is already being played can signal a lack
of commitment. In other words, certain regulatory measures can affect

CASE STUDIES ON NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS

Network Industry Regulation 727

private investors’ risk perception. That, in turn, affects present and future
investments in other sectors.24
When a regulatory compromise is not sufficiently clear or when there is a
threat it will crack, openings for post-contractual opportunism are created
for both sides. When an investor foresees institutional instability, there can
be underinvestment or hold-up effects.

There are also frequent rate

increases to pass on costs because it is difficult for private companies to
absorb such losses.25
Parker and Kirkpatrick26 mention an example from South Africa where,
in April 2001, the concessionaire Siza refused to make a previously agreedupon payment to the municipality, alleging that the financial results had
been disappointing.27

According to the terms of the contract, the

municipality could have retaliated with a stipulated fine.28

However,

because of the obvious lack of an alternative concessionaire, prices had to
be increased 15 percent to return Siza to profitability.29
In summary, present regulation operates in a limited way when it seeks to
change the terms of the regulatory commitment agreed upon and
crystallized in the past. If this is correct, the casuistic or populist treatment
of rate adjustments means a jolt to the regulatory commitment. This can, to
the harm of everyone, lead to the suspension of private investments or,
because of the increased perception of regulatory risk, can lead to an
undesirable increase in the service rate or a delay in the fulfillment of
investment obligations and quality commitments.
Such conclusions, however, must be treated with caution when dealing
with regulatory changes that are based on legitimate initiatives within the
framework of the democratic game. Proposed changes to the law or to
policy guidelines for a sector should not be summarily presumed to be
“populist,” “opportunistic,” or “casuistic.”

They may be perfectly

legitimate, although in some cases inappropriate. Once again, this point
illustrates the tension between stability and flexibility.30
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II. COUNTERPRODUCTIVE REGULATION
Regulation of economic activities may bring undesirable results because
it can be a form of counterproductive intervention in the dynamic
functioning of the market. A neo-liberal economist would take the extreme
position of asserting that almost all regulation of the market is
counterproductive, and that if a market is free from public intervention it
will adjust and regulate itself. It is not surprising, then, that there are
abundant discussions of the paradoxical effects of regulation in relevant
literature.31
There are numerous examples of undesired (or counterproductive)
possible effects in the field of regulation, as well as in the field of law in
general. For example attempts to control automobile pollution with rules
that limit the emission of carbon dioxide will likely increasing costs and, as
a result, may induce drivers to continue using their older, more-polluting
cars. Attempts to reduce pollution levels with regulations can also cause
more pollution when equally polluting products are substituted for those
that are meant to be eliminated.32

Rules to protect minorities, and

affirmative action policies in general, can be harmful to minorities if they
exacerbate hatred and intolerance.33 Also, a rule that is intended to avoid a
particular socially undesirable result frequently acts as a self-fulfilling
prophecy or as a perverse incentive against compliance.34
Some argue that social regulation—the imposition of unprofitable
investment targets in public services and rate adjustments that do not
entirely reflect the costs in a sector, for example—is a form of
distributionist policy that can cause collateral inefficiencies.35 This line of
argument maintains that when those inefficiencies are quantified and added
together, the detrimental result is larger than the intended benefits of the
regulation.36
Well-meaning regulation can also lead to reactions of “creative
adaptation,” where the agent subject to regulation seeks to avoid the
incidence of the rule; or “creative compliance,” where the agent subject to
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regulation obeys the rule, but does so in a way that mitigates its effects.37
Many believe that the markets simply “adjust” the burdens that state
intervention brings so that, in the end, the results may, once again, be the
opposite of those desired.38
The proposal to end the monthly subscription fee for fixed-line telephone
service in Brazil is a recent example of an attempt to impose regulations in
the telecommunications sector that, although well-intentioned, legitimate,
and intended to benefit low-income citizens, could produce undesired
effects. We will discuss this proposal in the remaining sections of this
article.

III. THE PROPOSAL TO END THE MONTHLY SUBSCRIPTION FEE AND
THE REGULATORY COMMITMENT IN THE FIXED-LINE TELEPHONE
SERVICE CONCESSION CONTRACTS IN BRAZIL
In 2001, Representative Marcelo Teixeira (PMDB—Ceará) presented to
the Brazilian federal legislature Bill 5.476/01, which would modify the
General Telecommunications Law.39

The bill proposed removing

subscriptions as a chargeable item for a fixed-line telephone service. As
noted by Representative Teixeira, the high fees that the fixed-line telephone
companies charge make it difficult for low-income consumers to afford
access to the service. Representative Luiz Bittencourt, the reporter for the
House of Representatives Committee for Consumer Defense, the
Environment, and Minorities, issued a favorable report on the bill and
emphasized that the cost of the monthly subscription has gone from R$0.65
in 1995 to an average of R$30.00 today.40 The bill proposed amending
Article 103 of the General Telecommunications Law so that it reads: “(3A)—For telephone calls made by means of fixed-line telephone service
provided in the public regimen, the subscriber will pay only for the time
actually used.”41
The representative presents the following justification:
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[W]ith the purpose of ensuring less fortunate consumers access to
telephone service, we present this text, which establishes for the
regulator the definition of a basic plan in which the rate is made up
of the time actually used by the subscriber only, in this way
protecting the customer who makes a small number of calls. In
light of the importance of ensuring universal service, not only by
offering a telephone line, but through conditions for its actual use,
I call on my illustrious colleagues to support this bill.42
Eliminating the subscription fee for fixed-line telephone service in this
way is legitimate inasmuch as it arises out of the democratic process.
However, the possible results are no small matter: it could create a rupture
of the regulatory commitments in the telecommunications sector, which
could then lead to the deleterious effects described earlier, such as the holdup of future investments. The subscription fee currently corresponds to an
expectation of revenue on the part of the concessionaires, and that revenue
is guaranteed in the concession contract.43 It does not merely arise from a
unilateral decision by the concessionaires, but is part of the rate policy
framework established by the regulator itself.44
The fixed-line telephone service concession contracts in the regulator’s
local modality expressly contemplate the possibility of a periodic charge
(subscription) as consideration for simply maintaining the user’s access.45
According to Exhibit III to these contracts, which describes the local basic
service plan that must be offered by the concessionaire, the following are
allowable rate items: a hookup charge, which can be charged when the user
obtains access to the service by receiving a dedicated line; a subscription
charge, to be paid monthly to maintain the right to use the service; and a use
charge, which is based on the length of the calls.46
The maximum amount that the contracts establish for each of these
components obviously considers the total revenue that the concessionaire
can earn.47 The per-minute charge for telephone use was established at a
given level with the expectation that the concessionaire would also have
revenue from both hookup and subscription charges. Not considering any
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one of these items during the preparation of the concession contract would
imply an increase in the amounts attributed to the other items.48
Viewed from this perspective, the proposal to eliminate subscriptions
could, in practice, be innocuous or even counterproductive in regard to its
goals, thus creating an undesirable situation of regulatory instability. The
reason is that the fixed-line telephone concession contracts have clauses
stating that the economic-financial equilibrium of the contracts will be
maintained, which is normal for contracts governing this kind of
relationship with the government.49
Properly understood, this clause should not be seen as a guaranteed return
on investment, which experience has shown to be rather inefficient. What
is provided for, instead, is the preservation of certain minimum conditions,
existing at the moment the contract is signed, that afford a private agent a
certain degree of foreseeability regarding the long-term relationship the
agent is entering into. It is in this sense that we stated above that the clause
contains, to a large extent, the heart of the regulatory commitment.
This reservation is important insofar as there is no reason to derive from
this guarantee an absolute assurance of the immutability of the initial
concession conditions.

That is because Brazilian administrative law

traditionally attributed such a guarantee to clauses regarding the
maintenance of economic-financial equilibrium.50 This practice arose from
the type of regulation that was adopted for public services—a regulation
based on public monopolies, the rates for which were established in light of
the regulated company’s total costs, plus a rate of return on the capital
invested.51
Under such regulation, the concessionaire could intend to ensure a
minimum return on its investment and, depending on the case, could require
a revision to the rate structure if it was not achieving that return for a reason
that could not be directly imputed to the concessionaire.52 In that case, if
the government were to decide to change certain conditions for the
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provision of the service, it would be expected to change the rate structure in
such a way as to preserve the concessionaire’s expected return.
However, it is apparent that continuing adherence to that perspective is
improper. This is especially true in contexts in which the services have
come to be provided in a competitive environment, such as mobile
telecommunications, gas, and electricity distribution.

The current

regulatory model for the telecommunications sector has abandoned the
practice of setting the fee based on a calculation of costs and a guaranteed
rate of return to the concessionaire, just as it has broken with the monopoly
structure.53

It is therefore necessary to adapt the application of the

guarantee of economic-financial equilibrium to this new scenario,
recognizing that the regulation has become more flexible in this realm.
In the current fixed-line telephone service concession contracts, despite
the reference to a guarantee of economic-financial equilibrium, the
possibility of any contractual change resulting from changes in market
conditions, and changes that result from the concessionaire having to face
competition from other companies, is expressly excluded.54 Thus, losses
arising from diminished market share, which results from the entry of new
competitors, cannot be reimbursed through revision of the terms of the
concession or of the rate structure and cannot be the basis for a request for
indemnification from the government.

Therefore, there is a necessary

degree of uncertainty and a component of risk implicit in the economic
return that the service provider will receive, as is made clear in the
concession contracts.55
The concession contracts clearly rule out any attempt to recompose the
rate structure due to changes in market conditions.56 One clause is even
more explicit in stating that “the concessionaire’s losses or reduction in
profits due to the uninhibited provision of the service in competitive
conditions or due to inefficient management of its business will not be taken
into account in the revision of the rate structure.”57

Additionally, the

concession contracts expressly state that the concessionaire will not have
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the right to any form of exclusivity and cannot claim a right regarding new
providers of the same service, in the public or private domain.58
It is important to understand that changes in market conditions, which are
excluded from the protection contained in the contract, are not limited to
situations where new concessions or authorizations for fixed-line telephone
service are granted by ANATEL.59 The change in competitive conditions
can result from price movements or technological innovations that allow
consumers to replace fixed-line telephone service with services that serve
analogous functions for the same price or less.
In Brazil, one can already observe the replacement of fixed-line
telephone lines with prepaid mobile phones because it is common for
people with limited means to only have a mobile phone.60 More recently,
technological changes have made it viable to offer Internet telephone
services (VoIP) on a large scale, including in more profitable market
segments such as business customers.61

In these two situations, the

concessionaire has no right to request a rate revision under the terms of the
contract. Any market loss would be within the normal ambit of risk for a
business activity carried on in a competitive marketplace. The possibility
that a business will be affected by innovations developed by others that
reduce costs for, or offer new services to, consumers is an integral part of
any competitive economic environment.
In this context, the concession contracts, and the flexible manner in
which they conceive of the question of economic-financial equilibrium,
simply reflect the system introduced by the General Telecommunications
Law. Under this system, the imposition of a public law service regimen for
some operators does not change the fact that what is intended, for the sector
as a whole, is to create a competitive environment that includes agents that
act in the public law regime.62
It is, therefore, undeniable that the traditional framework under which
public services (particularly telecommunications) were rendered was
adapted to the influences that mark the new way of regulating the sector.
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This can be seen both in the ambit of the relationship between the operators,
in which the intent to encourage the development of market mechanisms is
clear, and in the rules that establish the relationship between the
government and the concessionaires.63 In each of these frameworks, there
is greater flexibility compared to the rules that traditionally governed
private agents acting as suppliers of utility services.64 This can be seen in
the method that governs the guarantee of economic-financial equilibrium.
However, these observations do not mean that consideration of the
economic-financial equilibrium is irrelevant in the current concession
contracts. On the contrary, there are express terms in the contracts that aim
to preserve certain conditions in existence at the moment of contracting, as
described above, even though the terms do not provide a broad right to
review the initial economic-financial equation of the contract.65
Although the concessionaire’s right does not include situations that result
from changes in market conditions, it undeniably includes situations in
which a larger or additional burden arises from the government’s unilateral
imposition.66 This is clearly established in the contract.67 The purpose is to
offer a minimum amount of security, which investors require before they
are willing to justify the considerable investments related to the concession.
Operating in a competitive market always presents risks for the
businessperson; it is the presence of these risks that forces the
businessperson to seek greater efficiency and quality in order to earn a
profit and not lose market share. Because the choice was made to break
with the old monopoly system in the telecommunications sector,68 it would
be senseless to protect private agents from the risks inherent in any
economic activity carried out in a competitive environment. On the other
hand, it is appropriate to protect the businessperson against changes that
could be imposed by a unilateral government decision rather than by the
market itself.
An increase in the universal service burdens placed on the
concessionaire—beyond those already established at the beginning of the
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concession—is an example of a situation in which the concessionaire must
be guaranteed some kind of compensation, and that compensation occurs
through access to resources from the Fund for the Universalization of
Telecommunications Services (abbreviation in Portuguese: FUST).69
Likewise, prohibiting a subscription charge could lead to a request for a rate
revision where the lost revenue would be compensated with increases in the
other rates.
If the economic-financial equilibrium clause in the concession contract is
respected, and if the proper rate-adjustment procedure is followed after a
subscription charge period has legally ended, the probable consequence
would be an increase either in the per-minute rate or in the hookup fee. For
the per-minute rate, it is possible to imagine that the bills of those
individuals who do not use all of the minutes included in the subscription
(and who, in theory, would benefit from subscriptions being ended) would
go back to paying about the same amount as they were with subscription
service, with the exception of consumers who use the telephone mainly to
receive calls. In regard to the remaining consumers, it is not improbable
that their telephone bills would increase because of the more expensive perminute rate. On the other hand, if the adjustment were made to the hookup
fee, ending the subscription could have the paradoxical effect of making
access to the service even more difficult.70
One might argue that, in view of the fact that the right to a rate review is
clearly foreseen in the concession contract, the proposal should not be seen
as a rupture of the regulatory commitment. The legislators could be seen as
simply trying to modify the rate structure of the service (but not the revenue
of the companies), creating a more efficient scheme under which no major
impact would be imposed on the concessionaires since the concessionaires
would be entitled to a revision of the per-minute rate or the hookup fee.
There are, however, circumstances demonstrating that this argument is
misconceived. First, there was no inquiry or evaluation reported by the
proponents of the draft statute regarding the price structure of the service.71
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They did not show any concern regarding the efficiency of the rate formula
foreseen in the concession contract, and their rhetoric pointed broadly to
equity and distributional issues, making a general claim that rates were too
high. The implicit result of that claim is admitting the possibility of a
mandatory transfer of wealth from the private companies to low-income
users.72
Second, if they admitted the possibility that other components of the
concessionaire revenues could be subject to an increase, it would be
reasonable for them to have foreseen it in the draft statute. However, the
draft merely changes the law in order to forbid the subscription fee.73
But most importantly, as suggested in the paragraphs above, a revision of
the per-minute rate or the hookup fee could lead to effects that are the
opposite of those anticipated by the draft statute, creating uncertainty as to
how the regulatory agency would respond to a request for rate revisions by
the concessionaires in a political scenario supporting the draft statute.
These circumstances and uncertainties were clearly perceived by the
private companies as an attempt to challenge the regulatory commitment.74
The revision of the per-minute rate or the hookup fee would depend on a
future regulatory procedure before ANATEL. The result of that could be
unfavorable to the concessionaires, considering that ANATEL would face
significant pressure from legislators once legislators understood that the
intended long-term practical effects of the proposal to prohibit subscription
fees would require impeding the application of one of the key sections of
the concession contracts. Furthermore, even if the concessionaires’ right
was enforced in the end, this sort of procedure tends to be time-consuming
and lengthy, and would comprise a period in which the concessionaires
would have no compensation for their loss in revenue.
If ANATEL were to choose not to enforce the right of the
concessionaires, the decision would certainly cause an even more unstable
situation in the sector and would probably hold back new investments and
lead to a conflict between the regulator and the regulated companies. This,
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in turn, would affect the fulfillment of other obligations contained in the
concession contracts, such as those regarding the universal scope and
quality of service.
At most, in such an unstable situation (as is discussed in Part III), it is
possible that a threat from the regulator to terminate the concession and
grant it to a third party might not be a sufficient stimulus to avoid a conflict
in which the concessionaire reneges on its obligations—it would be
difficult, after all, to find another investor to take over the concession in an
atmosphere of such legal uncertainty.75
What one sees, in essence, is that a particular measure, disassociated
from the pre-existing regulatory commitment established between the
regulator and the regulated entity, can have effects that are the opposite of
those intended. This is even more serious when one takes into account that
the regulatory commitment established in the case of telecommunications in
Brazil is not completely rigid and allows for a certain degree of openness
and flexibility.
First, there is no protection for concessionaires from changes that result
from technological developments or increased competition.76 Nor is there
anything that prohibits the creation of new services that could meet the
demand that is targeted by the bill we are criticizing. Also, there is a
provision conveying that, relatively soon after the privatization and signing
of the concession contracts, there would be revisions of the current
conditions through the signing of new contracts, which happened recently in
2006.77 Finally, there is a complete system of laws aimed to guarantee
universal telecommunications service, and those laws could have been used
to achieve the intended results of ending subscriptions.78 In sum, there are
alternatives that would not cause instability in telecommunications
regulation and would not have potential to cause undesirable effects, more
of which will be mentioned in the next section. This argument is not
intended to defend the interests of the concessionaires, but rather to suggest
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the importance of an adequate discussion about the effects of a change such
as the one proposed by the bill.
In this regard, the desirability of better communication between the
legislature and the regulatory agency is clear—in this case, ANATEL stated
its opposition to ending subscriptions more than once.79 The importance of
basing proposed laws on technical studies that allow for the consideration of
plausible causalities is also clear.80
The observations in this part of the article have been made without a
detailed analysis of the concessionaires’ economic-financial situation. In
these circumstances, it is undeniable that ending subscriptions would cut off
a legitimate revenue expectation under the concession contracts and,
consequently, would have a definite negative financial effect on the
concessionaires. However, it is not improbable that the concessionaires
would suffer a much smaller decrease in their profits than what they have
been stating in the media.81 If the concessionaires were to experience this
more modest revenue decrease, they could absorb the revenue loss without
compromising their return on investment due to the efficiency gains,
technological advances, and changes in consumption levels since the
concessions contracts were signed.
However, this speculation would not be sufficient to overcome the
criticism of the way in which the bill proposes to end subscriptions, as
outlined above. As we noted, there was no analysis of the economic impact
in preparing the proposals to change the General Telecommunications Law.
On the other hand, the existing regulatory framework has mechanisms that
prevent concessionaires from completely appropriating gains from
technological advances at the expense of the users.

The General

Telecommunications Law says: “[E]conomic gains resulting from
modernization, expansion or rationalization of the services, as well as new,
alternative revenues [must be] shared with the users, in the terms regulated
by the Agency [ANATEL].”82
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In other words, the current regulatory commitment itself has mechanisms
that allow for requiring the concessionaires to share (with consumers) the
gains they achieve as a result of changes to the conditions in which the
services are provided. The General Telecommunications Law indicates that
this should be done in the context of an administrative process with
ANATEL so that the question of whether there are actually gains to be
shared can be evaluated.83

IV. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR LOW-INCOME CUSTOMERS’
ACCESS TO TELEPHONE SERVICES
The bill analyzed in the previous part of the artcile, though inadequate
and prone to results that are the opposite of those intended, is motivated by
a problem that does actually exist in the telecommunications sector.
Although fixed-line telephone service has expanded significantly in recent
years since Brazil’s state-owned monopoly telephone system (Telebrás) was
privatized, lower-income customers remain incapable of acquiring private
lines.
It is well known that there are a large number of unused lines that were
installed when the concessionaires met their universal services obligations.
According to the Ministry of Communications, the number of fixed lines
went from 22.1 million in 1998 to 49.2 million in December 2002.84
However, the number of lines actually in service was only 38.8 million.85
This significant difference is related to the fact that a substantial part of the
population cannot afford the cost of a line; it does not indicate that demand
in the country has been fully met, only that a group of individuals cannot
afford the service. 86
Therefore, it is necessary to discuss alternatives that can make fixed-line
telephone service accessible to a larger number of people. To focus the
question exclusively on a basic subscription fee is not, as we have argued,
the best solution. The reduction of the cost of service for low-income
customers needs to be part of the context of a coherent universal service
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policy that recognizes how the telecommunications sector has evolved in
recent years. Moreover, regulatory changes cannot have results that are the
opposite of those desired, which would result from concessionaires’
increased costs being passed on to consumers. We are not questioning the
good intentions behind the proposal to end subscriptions; what we are
questioning is the means and the timing to make subscriptions a reality.87
The following are some examples of policies that would achieve the aim
of facilitating the access to telephone services by low-income users: (i)
giving selective tax exemptions to low-income citizens; (ii) designing
different service plans with reduced prices; and (iii) giving subsidies with
money from FUST.
In regard to the first option—tax exemptions—we note that the Tax on
the Circulation of Merchandise and Services (abbreviation in Portuguese—
ICMS) is quite high on telecommunications services.88 In general, the tax
rate is 25 percent, but some states charge a higher rate.89 It is clearly a
significant part of the telephone bill. The selective reduction of this tax
would tend to reduce low-income consumers’ telephone bills. This could
be achieved by identifying objective criteria to which the reduced tax rate
would be applied, such as applying the reduced rate to residential accounts
up to certain amounts. However, putting this into practice would involve a
difficult compromise among all of the states in the Brazilian federation,
because tax receipts from telecommunications services represent a
significant income for the states.90
The second option—designing reduced-price alternative service plans
that are tailored to the needs and means of low-income consumers—has
been suggested by ANATEL.91 An example would be offering prepaid
fixed-line telephone service that would have a low subscription rate and a
higher per-minute rate. The prepaid alternative could be successful when
one considers the experience in Brazil with this payment scheme for cellular
phones, which made them more thoroughly available to the Brazilian
population.92 The user of a “prepaid” cellular phone usually pays a fee to
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buy a telephone and subscribe to an operator.93

He or she then buys

94

Since the user does not

minutes in advance, according to his or her needs.

need to pay to receive incoming calls, he can use the line only when
necessary and can limit his expenditures by making fewer outgoing calls.95
Due in part to this payment scheme, the number of cellular phones in use in
Brazil has risen from 1.4 million in 1995 to an impressive 95.8 million in
2006.96
The third suggestion would involve creating subsidy schemes using
money from FUST, the fund created to promote universal service in
telecommunications services (but which, so far, has not been used). In our
opinion, the subsidy could be structured in two ways: (i) direct subsidies to
the telephone companies that make the services available to low-income
users; or (ii) telephone service vouchers that would be given to consumers
to use with the telephone company of their choice.
The use of vouchers presupposes the existence of a competitor in the
local market for fixed telephone services. Although this sector has gone
through deep liberalization in Brazil, little or no competition has developed
in local markets.97 Furthermore, competitors of the incumbent company
tend to focus on high-income users.98

Notwithstanding these facts, a

voucher scheme still makes sense because it might foster competition if the
incumbent’s competitor finds it profitable to serve the low-income user at
the same rates charged by the incumbent. If the user has no competitive
alternative, he can still use the voucher to reduce the amount that should be
paid to the incumbent.
None of these possibilities would have such direct, foreseeable effects on
what we refer to as the regulatory commitment. A tax reduction would be
welcomed by the telephone companies, though it would reduce the states’
tax receipts.99 The use of money from FUST would be equally welcomed,
in this instance, by society as a whole. The proposal for a new service
package involving prepaid fixed-line telephone service would focus on

VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 2 • 2007

742 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

giving low-income users an alternative rather than on changing the entire
revenue structure of the concessionaires.
From these three options, the second—creating a special class of
service—would have the most realistic chance of being implemented. The
first option of selective tax exemptions would meet strong political
opposition for the reasons already stated above. On the other hand, the
discussion regarding the use of money from FUST is currently focused
primarily on investment in access-to-data networks—essentially, the
Internet.100
In summary, all three possible options would be viable ways to address
access problem to telecommunications services without causing reasonably
foreseeable undesirable consequences. And they would have the additional
advantage—like VoIP, which has significantly reduced the price of local,
long-distance, and international calls—of not running up against the
regulatory commitment, regardless of what one may think of that
commitment.

V. CONCLUSION
As we noted throughout this article, extemporaneous changes to
regulatory rules, even when they aim to achieve goals that few would object
to, can be counterproductive and, in the end, can prejudice those whose
interests are allegedly being protected. This is because such changes could
lead to one or more of three outcomes: rate increases, reduction in
investment and delays in fulfilling obligations, or increases in investors’
general risk perception.
Regulation should not, however, be impervious to change.

On the

contrary, regulation’s malleability and adaptability should be valued and
pursued, since it has to be in accordance with legitimated equity claims and
fast technical changes.

Furthermore, these changes might arise with

legitimacy from non-technical (non-regulatory) agencies. In this context,
legislative initiatives to change the course of regulation are healthy and can
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promote oversight and accountability of the regulators, who are essentially
technocrats. Such initiatives must not neglect a more complete discussion
of the effects of rules that, however well-intentioned, can reasonably be
predicted to have counterproductive results.
The example analyzed from the Brazilian telecommunications sector
confirms this proposition. The draft statute, aimed at tackling universal
service challenges, was proposed in a way perceived by the companies
rendering the services as a rupture of the regulatory commitment.101
Furthermore, the proposal ignored an evaluation and previous assessment of
the actual effects and possible outcomes of its implementation. Finally,
Brazilian legislators have also ignored other alternatives to promote the
same goal—alternatives that could achieve a desired result more efficiently
and without jeopardizing the regulatory commitment.102
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Independently of the terms of 13.1, it will be appropriate to revise the rates
making up the Local Service Basic Plan in favor of the Concessionaire or of the
users, in accordance with Article 108 of Law 9.472 of 1997, when one of the
following specific situations arises:
I - A unilateral modification to this Contract imposed by ANATEL that causes a
significant variation in costs or revenues, either higher or lower, in such a way
that a rate increase or decrease is necessary to avoid unjust enrichment by either
of the parties;
II - A change in the tax system after this Contract is signed that implies an
increase or reduction in the Concessionaire’s potential profitability;
III - Supervening occurrences that arise from acts of state or of the government
that can be proved to result in a change to the Concessionaire’s costs;
IV - A legislative change of a specific nature that directly affects the
Concessionaire’s revenue in such a way as to affect the continuity or quality of
the service provided; or
V - A legislative change that benefits the Concessionaire, including one that
gives or takes away an exemption, reduction, discount or any other tax or rate
privilege, in accordance with what is stated in Article 108(3) of Law 9.472 of
1997.
1. Losses or diminished profits for the Concessionaire that result from its
uninhibited provision of the service in competitive conditions or from inefficient
management of its business will not lead to a rate revision.
2. The review described in item II of this section will not be applicable when the
change in the tax system results in the creation, suppression, elevation or
reduction of taxes incident to the Concessionaire’s income or profit, such as the
income tax, that does not result in an administrative or operational burden.
3. The rate revision described in this section will not be applicable when the
triggering events for the revision are already covered by the insurance plan
described in section 24.1.
4. The Concessionaire’s contributions to the Fund for the Universalization of
Telecommunications Services and to the Fund for the Technological
Development of Telecommunications will not to result in rate revisions.
68

See Faraco et al., supra note 8 (describing the opening of the Brazilian
telecommunications market).
69
FUST is a fund created by Lei 9.998/00 to subsidize universal services polices in
Brazil. Lei no. 9.998/00, de 17 de agosto de 2000. Its main source of revenue is a
contribution levied on the revenue of all telecommunications companies. See generally
MINISTÉRIO DAS COMUNICAÇÕES, DIAGNÓSTICO DE NECESSIDADES DE
UNIVERSALIZAÇÃO DE SERVIÇOS DE TELECOMUNIÇÕACES NO BRASIL,
http://www.mc.gov.br/sites/600/695/ 00001915.pdf (providing general information on
FUST).
70
These scenarios are hypothetical. It is not the result of a simulation based on a
detailed study of Brazilian fixed-line telephone service consumer behavior. Although it
is possible to argue that the inverse is true and that consumers might not be affected by
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the change in many cases, such an evaluation was not done in the context of the bill we
are commenting on. What we are trying to demonstrate is simply that a proposal without
a technical basis and analysis of economic impact might result in an imbalance in the
relationship between the government and the concessionaire without achieving its
intended results.
71
See Comissão de Defesa do Consumidor, Meio Ambinete e Minorias, supra note 42.
72
See the Report by Representative Luiz Bittencourt, available at http://www2.camara.
gov.br/proposicoes/loadFrame.html?link=http://www.camara.gov.br/internet/sileg/prop_l
ista.asp?fMode=1&btnPesquisar=OK&Ano=2001&Numero=5476&sigla=PL.
73
See Projecto de lei, No. 5.476, de 2001 (Brazil).
74
These companies have strongly opposed the draft statutes, a fact that was reported in
the Brazilian press and can be confirmed by consulting the several technical papers made
available on the website of the association that represents the concessionaires. See
Associação Brasileira de Concessionárias de Serviço Telefônico Fixo Comutado
(Abrafix), Press Room,
http://www.abrafix.org.br/v2/sala_imprensa_base.php?i=
4&area=3.2 (last visited March 26, 2007).
75
It is possible to imagine extreme situations in which this would not happen, such as if
the concession were nationalized without any indemnification and then granted to a new
concessionaire who would only be obligated to run and maintain the existing network
(who, if not required to make any investment, could be interested in taking over the
concession). In that case, the negative effect would show up over a longer time, when it
became necessary to find sources to finance an expansion of the network.
76
See Contrato de Concessao, supra note 10, at ch. 13.
77
See General Telecommunications Law, art. 207(1).
78
See Lei No. 9.998, de 17 de agosto de 2000 (creating the Fundo de Universalização
dos Serviços de Telecomunicação ( FUST) in Brazil).
79
The position of ANATEL was reported in the Brazilian press. See, e.g., Anatel critica
fim da assinatura de telephone proposta pela Camara, O GLOBO (Braz.), May 6, 2004.
80
The brief justification attached to Bill 5.476/01 does not make reference to any
technical study that could support its conclusion that ending the subscription fee would
foster access to the service.
81
See Press Release, Abrafix, A Tarifa de Assinatura Mensal na Telefonia Fixa no
Brasil, available at http://www.abrafix.org.br/admin/imagens/upload/sala_imprensa_
arquivos/discurso6.pdf (regarding the proposal to end the subscription fee) (hereinafter
Subscription Fee Press Release).
82
General Telecommunications Law, art. 108(2).
83
We do not intend to state that the legislature cannot act in this regard through changes
in the law that allow for achieving the goal of Article 108(2) of the General
Telecommunications Law. This could even be a way to deal with a possible capture of
the regulator by the regulated entity, causing the agency to fail to apply the law in
question. What we emphasize, however, is the opportunistic nature of the bill which does
not concern itself with understanding the regulatory framework, investigate possible
changes in the conditions in which the services are provided, or identify a failure by
ANATEL. The bill is, therefore, an act that increases uncertainty about the rules that
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apply to the telecommunications sector, leading to an increase in the regulated entities’
perception of risk.
84
See Ministério das Comunicações,
Acessos fixos comutados instalados,
http://www.mc.gov.br/005/00502001.asp?ttCD_CHAVE=7774 (last visited March 27,
2007).
85
Id.
86
See generally Faraco et al., supra note 8.
87
It appears that enough time has now passed to recognize that Brazil’s policy for
universalizing telecommunications access has not followed a steady and coherent
strategy. As governments and regulators come and go, regulation in this sector has lost
its continuity and objectivity, with its policies following the plans of whatever group is in
control at the moment. It is unnecessary to point out the impediment this presents to
achieving the desired goals and consolidating the regulation. See Faraco, supra note 53.
88
The ICMS is similar to a value added tax (VAT) imposed on goods and certain
services. Each state of the Brazilian federation has authority to create and levy its ICMS,
which makes it difficult to coordinate actions regarding this tax on a national level, since
this would depend on the agreement of all states.
89
See
Abrafix,
http://www.abrafix.org.br/admin/imagens/upload/sala_imprensa_
arquivos/tabela_icms.pdf (providing data) (last visited March 26, 2007).
90
Each one of the states has a considerable degree of autonomy to legislate about ICMS
and determine its rate. Therefore, to implement a national reduction of such tax on
telephone services would require the agreement of all states.
91
See Consulta Pública No. 457, de 6 de juhnho de 2003 (regarding Special Class
Individual Access (abbreviation in Portuguese AICE) to fixed-line telephone service).
92
See generally Faraco et al., supra note 8 (discussing more specific data concerning the
use of cellular phones in Brazil).
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
See Faraco, supra note 53.
96
From these 95.8 million lines in use, approximately 77.3 million were sold under the
“prepaid” scheme. See ANATEL, Dados Relevantes do SMP, Septembro 2006, at 6,
available at http://www.anatel.gov.br/Tools/frame.asp?link=/comunicacao_movel/smc/
dados_relevantes_smc_smp.pdf.
97
See generally Faraco, supra note 53.
98
Id.
99
See Press Release, supra note 81.
100
See Faraco, supra note 53. Following Consulta Pública No. 457, supra note 91,
Anatel actually implemented an alternative service as of the end of 2005. It offers a
discount of 40% on the monthly subscription fee (but does not abolishes it) and the user
may subscribe to it under a prepaid modality. See Press Release, Anatel, Anatel publica
regulamento do Acesso Individual Classe Especial (Aice), (Dec. 20, 2005),
http://www.anatel.gov.br/Tools/frame.asp?link=/biblioteca/releases/2005/release_20_12_
2005rl.pdf. Since making calls from it is more expensive, and the subscription fee has
been maintained in part and does not entitle the user to any calls, the results of
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introducing this alternative service are highly uncertain and probably will not make a
considerable difference.
101
See Press Release, supra note 81.
102
See Comissão de Defesa do Consumidor, supra note 42.
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